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RELATIONAL FEDERALISM: AN ESSAY IN HONOR
OF HEATHER GERKEN
David Fontana*
We are here to celebrate the work of Heather Gerken, so allow me first to point out
what might be the most unique feature of Gerken's work: she is not easily classified by
the subject matter she addresses. Indeed, she might properly be labeled a public law the-
orist, even though that term is not usually used to describe American law professors. We
instead use doctrinal divisions to label ourselves in the United States - we are scholars
of constitutional law, or corporate law. The labels at law schools overseas about the
"faculty of public law" or the "faculty of private law" are not used as often in the United
States.1
Substantial parts of Gerken's work do have specific doctrinal homes. She might be
labeled a constitutional law scholar, or even more precisely an election law scholar.2 She
works on election law issues in practice. Always looking to draw larger connections,
* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. My thanks to the editors of
the Tulsa Law Review and to Heather Gerken for inviting me to participate in this symposium. My essay is on a
serious topic, but I want to include in this footnote a brief, personal tribute to Heather similar to the one I of-
fered at Tulsa. It is rare to be both excellent and kind. Heather is both. She has managed to serve as a mentor to
so many young students and young scholars, myself included, and to do so in a way that has always empha-
sized a touch of the personal and professional. Her scholarly voice is unique and important, but her generosity
perhaps even more so.
1. As an example, consider the prominent Max Planck Institutes in Germany, divided into public law insti-
tutes and private law institutes. See MAX PLANCK INST. FOR COMP. PUB. L. AND INT'L L.,
http://www.mpil.de/ww/en/pub/news.cfm (last visited Apr. 7, 2013); MAX PLANCK INST. FOR COMP. AND
INT'L PRIVATE L., http://www.mpg.de/150209/privatrecht (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
2. See Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 708 (2006); Heather K. Gerken, Election Law Exceptionalism?: A Bird's Eye View of the
Symposium, 82 B.U. L. REV. 737 (2002); Heather K. Gerken, Getting From Here to There in Election Reform,
34 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 33 (2009); Heather K. Gerken, Getting From Here to There in Redistricting Reform,
5 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2010); Heather K. Gerken, In Praise of Rankings, 19 WIDENER L.J. 1
(2009); Heather Gerken, Keynote Address: Lobbying as the New Campaign Finance, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
1155 (2011); Heather K. Gerken, Lost in the Political Thicket: The Court, Election Law, and the Doctrinal In-
terrengum, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 503 (2004); Heather K. Gerken, Morgan Kousser's Noble Dream, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1298 (2001) (reviewing J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS AND
THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION (1999)); Heather K. Gerken, New Wine in Old Bottles: A
Comment on Richard Hasen's and Richard Briffault's Essays on Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 407
(2001); Heather K. Gerken, Rashomon and the Roberts Court, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1213 (2007); Heather K.
Gerken, Shortcuts to Reform, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1582 (2009); Heather K. Gerken, The Costs and Causes of
Minimalism in Voting Cases: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1411 (2002); Heather K. Gerken,
The Invisible Election: Making Policy in a World Without Data, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1013 (2009); Heather
K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1663 (2001).
3. See Arena Profile: Heather K. Gerken, POLITICO,
http://www.politico.com/arena/bio/heather k gerken.html (last updated 2010) ("In 2008 she served as a senior
adviser to the National Election Protection Team for Barack Obama's presidential campaign.").
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Gerken has used her election law scholarship to draw larger constitutional law connec-
tions.4
The part of her scholarship that has been even more influential - and the part that
I will discuss in this Essay - is not just a theory of election law, or even of constitution-
al law. It is a theory of public law, one that applies just as much to administrative agen-
cies, juries, and legislatures as it does to elections and courts. 5 Her scholarship about
second-order diversity6 and how second-order diverse actors can dissent by deciding is
about the relationship between political majorities and political minorities in a range of
public law institutions, or what she calls "federalism all the way down." 8
In this part of her scholarship, Gerken argues that institutions can be second-order
diverse - meaning there is "variation among decisionmaking bodies, not within them"9
- and that those institutional actors who are second-order diverse should sometimes use
the power of "dissenting by deciding," meaning that "dissenters could act radically....
[by] dissent taking the form of state action."10 Dissenters can control other institutions
(second-order diversity) and can use this control to dissent by deciding. Second-order
diversity is what makes dissenting by deciding possible (without diversity of the second-
order, it would involve majorities controlling all institutions).I1 Dissenting by deciding is
the action that is possible and should be used sometimes as a result of second-order di-
versity.12 Gerken argues that dissenting by deciding (what I will call "DBD") can be
used in any institutional context where "disagreement . .. stems from political princi-
ple"1 3 and "we can identify winners and losers." 14
The notion of DBD supplies a "transsubstantive vocabulary" 15 and "institutional
fixes across disciplines." 1 6 Because of its broad scope, DBD identifies a "set of distinc-
tions that run through large portions of constitutional law (and other areas as well)." 1 7
Following her most commonly used case study, in this Essay I will discuss DBD in the
4. See Heather K. Gerken, Keynote Address: What Election Law Has to Say About Constitutional Law, 44
IND. L. REv. 7 (2010-2011).
5. Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARv. L. REV. 4, 8 (2010) [herein-
after Gerken, Foreword] ("We have thus not imagined the many institutions. . . -Juries, zoning commissions,
local school boards, locally elected prosecutors' offices, state administrative agencies, and the like- as being
part of 'Our Federalism,' let alone developed an affirmative account of the role they might play in a larger
democratic system.").
6. See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARv. L. REV. 1099 (2005) [hereinafter Gerken,
Second-Order Diversity].
7. See Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005) [hereinafter Gerken,
Dissenting by Deciding]; Heather K. Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, 115 YALE L.J. 2633 (2006) [herein-
after Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants].
8. See Gerken, Foreword, supra note 5.
9. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, supra note 6, at 1102. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note
7, at 1754 (noting how dissenting by deciding has dissent "embodied in a decision" and involves second-order
diverse actors using the "authority of the state collectively").
10. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 7, at 1747.
11. See Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, supra note 6, at 1109-10.
12. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 7, at 1748.
13. Id. at 1753.
14. Id.
15. Gerken, OfSovereigns and Servants, supra note 7, at 2639.
16. Id
17. Id. at 2634.
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context of federalism. 18 Gerken often refers to the federalism debates as a case study of
the larger idea of DBD. 19
Many arguments for federalism rely on the greater number of institutions with the
power to make policy in a federal as opposed to a unitary system and the greater diversi-
ty of policy or politics that result from this greater number of institutions. This diversity
of policy or politics is something of a "public good" that a greater number of institutions
created by federalism is uniquely positioned to provide.20
Gerken relies on these numerical arguments in discussing how DBD adds to dis-
cussions of American federalism.21 Gerken argues that permitting political minorities to
make policy increases the effective number of institutions with power to make policy by
diversifying the factions controlling these institutions.22 DBD is "federalism all the way
down" 23 because it is federalism in greater numbers.
DBD's contribution is to argue that not only does the American system feature the
federal government in Washington, and the State of California, but it also features a
Mayor of San Francisco, Gavin Newsom, who disagrees with Washington and Sacra-
mento some of the time.24 Federalism before Gerken might count this as three separate
institutions with power, but Gerken counts it as three plus: three separate institutions but
with one of these institutions controlled by someone with a "minority view."25 We re-
ceive many of the benefits of federalism not just by having the United States, California,
and San Francisco, but by ensuring that at least some of those institutions are controlled
by political minorities because it gives us not just more institutions but more different
institutions.
There is an implicit, but central, empirical assumption behind DBD and behind
prior federalism scholarship: more institutions produce more diversity of outputs.26 This
need not be symmetrical, so that ten states need not produce ten times more different
outputs than one state. But scaling is substantial, so that ten states would produce mean-
ingfully more diversity than one state. The fact that there is a sum is what makes the sum
different from the parts.
As this Essay will briefly highlight, that assumption is important in evaluating fed-
eralism, and important in evaluating DBD. There are many reasons to believe that greater
18. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256
(2009) [hereinafter Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, Uncooperative]; Gerken, Foreword, supra note 5: Heather K.
Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1549 (2012).
19. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 7, at 1755 ("[F]ederalism offers a good example of
decisional dissent."); Id. at 1782 ("American federalism [is] the dominant example" of the trend."). See also
Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, supra note 7, at 2639 (listing "local government law, federalism and the
separation of powers" as examples of DBD).
20. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Case for Educational Federalism: Protecting Educational Policy from
the National Government's Diseconomies of Scale, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1941, 1966 (2012) ("Convention-
al federalism theory suggests [that federalism can provide] national public goods.").
21. See Gerken, Foreword, supra note 5, at 20.
22. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 7, at 1763-65.
23. Gerken, Foreword, supra note 5.
24. Mayor Newsom's decision to order the City of San Francisco to issue marriage licenses to same-sex
couples is an example of DBD that Gerken often references. See, e.g., Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra
note 7, at 1748; Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, supra note 7, at 2640-41.
25. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 7, at 1746-47.
26. See id at 1759-60.
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numbers of institutions produce greater diversity of outputs only some of the time. One
genre of reasons to question the assumption that greater numbers beget greater diversity
is atomistic, based on who might control the greater number of institutions.
Another genre of reasons, more relevant for our purposes, is relational. Federalism
is just as much about how institutions interact as it is about how many institutions there
are - in other words, federalism is relational just as much as it is numerical. If federal-
ism is a "dialogue," as David Shapiro suggests, 2 7 then we must examine how the dia-
logue not only engages institutions but also transforms them by engaging them in a dia-
logue. Federalism is constitutive as much as it is numerical. 2 8 For more numbers to
produce more diversity, institutions must interact in a particular way.
Atomistic and relational dimensions of federalism are important, but this Essay
will focus on the relational dimension for a simple reason: this is Gerken's contribution
to federalism scholarship, and more generally to public law theory. She might not realize
it, but she has theorized a new version of federalism because of how the federal govern-
ment and state governments interact in DBD. Her theory is original in substantial part
because it envisions a new form of relationships between institutions.
She might also not realize that the new relationships between these institutions in
DBD is not just what makes her federalism and public law theory new, but what makes it
compelling. There is pervasive social science evidence to suggest that the relationships
envisioned by DBD are not just "interesting" 29 but also uniquely ensure that the numeri-
cal dimension of federalism produces a diversity of outputs.
THE NUMERICAL ARGUMENTS FOR FEDERALISM AND DISSENTING BY DECIDING
A. The Standard Numerical Arguments for Federalism
Let's contrast federalism with its natural design opponent - unitary government.
A unitary government is a centralized government, meaning all ultimate power to govern
rests in the central government. The central government can be separated into constituent
parts, each with some separate policy powers, but separate policy powers dependent on
cooperation of the other parts of the central government. For instance, consider the ex-
ample of France, often cited as the paradigmatic example of a unitary system.30 The
French Constitution of 1958 creates "two Houses." 3 1 The French Constitution also fea-
tures a President with his own series of overlapping but separate powers,32 a Prime Min-
ister with his own powers,33 a court system with its own powers, 34 and a "Government"
27. See DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995).
28. Robert Schapiro also implies that the "interactive" dimensions of federalism might be consequential.
But that is because there is interaction, not because the interaction transforms institutions. See, e.g., Robert A.
Schapiro, Justice Stevens's Theory of Interactive Federalism, 74 FORD. L. REv. 2133, 2168 (2006) (arguing
that interaction between states "promote[s] the values of choice, self-governance, and restraining tyranny").
29. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, Uncooperative, supra note 18, at 1308.
30. See GEORGES R. DELAUME, BILATERAL STUDIES IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: AMERICAN-
FRENCH PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (Arthur Nussbaum ed., 2d ed. 1961) ("As a unitary government, no
constitutional issue of a federal nature could . . . be presented [in France].").
31. 1958 CONST. art. II (Fr.).
32. See id. at arts. 5-19.
33. Seeid.atart.21.
34. See id. at arts. 56-68.
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(meaning essentially the Cabinet) composed of "public legal entities"35 with its own
powers. Even with the major institutions of government all included as part of the central
government in Paris, there are still multiple, separate institutions.
This could exaggerate the number of separate institutions that exist in a unitary
system. It is difficult for these separate institutions to make any meaningful policy with-
out the cooperation of the other "separate" institutions. These separate institutions are all
ultimately part of the s'ame "indivisible" government of the Republic of France.36
Moreover, many of these separate institutions in the central government are only
separate in the sense that they are agents to another principal, and therefore they exercise
what we might call delegated powers. The Prime Minister of France, for instance, can
"delegate certain of his powers to Ministers." 37 The civil service can "determine[] and
conduct[] the policy" of France but is ultimately "[accountable] to Parliament." 38 But
delegable power can ultimately be un-delegated, so the separateness of the Ministers or
the civil service is only the default.
Federalism differs from unitary government because it creates an even larger num-
ber of distinct institutions with the power to make binding policy than institutions created
in a unitary system. Consider the American system as compared to the French system.
There are separate institutions at the central level in the United States, as in the French
system. But the federal government can only enact laws if it can identify some part of the
Constitution that authorizes it to act.39 Otherwise, the power to act rests either with "the
people" or "the States." 40 With fifty state governments, and with the potential for those
state governments to further sub-divide, this increases the number of separate institutions
substantially.
The amount of power that these central and non-central governments are granted
varies from federal system to federal system. In the United States, the modern Commerce
and Spending Clauses have been interpreted to grant the federal government substantial
powers, and the Supremacy Clause permits the federal government to preempt state gov-
ernments without having to articulate any reason why it would be better for the federal
government to regulate.41 In Canada, the provinces have limited powers and the central
government has residual powers.42 In the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity
35. Id. at art. 34.
36. See id. at art. 1.
37. Id. at art. 21.
38. Id. at art. 20.
39. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway et al., The Treaty Power: Its History, Scope, and Limits, 98 CORNELL L.
REV. 239, 324 (2013) ("The federal government is a government of limited powers.").
40. U.S. CONsT. amend. X.
41. The Supremacy Clause provides that "the [1]aws of the United States which shall be made in
[p]ursuance" of the Constitution are "the supreme (f]aw of the [1]and." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. So long as a
law is "made in pursuance" of the Constitution - meaning it can be grouped into one of the powers of the fed-
eral government - there is no separate requirement that it be important for the federal government to enact the
law. See id. The closest limitations to this have come from the Supreme Court's cases indicating that it is more
difficult for the federal government to argue that it is acting within one of its powers if it is regulating a topic
traditionally left for the states. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 615-16 (2000) (arguing that
it was "undoubtedly significant" that the federal law was touching on "family law and other areas of traditional
state regulation").
42. See 1 PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 504 (5th ed. 2007) ("The residuary nature
of the federal power in Canada is in contrast to the distribution of legislative powers in the earlier Constitution
of the United States. .. . There are reasons for supposing this difference ... was part of a design to create a
2013 507
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essentially creates a "for cause" requirement before the member-states can be preempt-
ed.4 3
These differences matter in classifying how much power these separate institutions
possess. State governments with more limited powers (like in Canada) might be able to
make fewer policies than state governments with more powers (like in the United States).
These are all differences of degree, not type, though, and the most important detail is that
federal systems have many more institutions that can make their own separate policies.
In all federal systems the number of meaningful separate institutions that can make laws
is far greater than one.
What results follow from this greater number of institutions empowered to make
policies? Federalism theory usually argues that a diversity of policies and politics is a
public good. And federalism theory usually argues that the greater number of institutions
in a federal system is uniquely positioned to provide this diversity of output. Policy
comes from Washington, but also from Albany, Oklahoma City and Sacramento, and this
generates a greater number of differential outputs than if all policy came from Washing-
ton.
Some of the arguments for federalism that see numbers begetting diversity see
numbers begetting policy diversity. The most noted defense of federalism is the innova-
tion defense, associated with Justice Louis Brandeis's laboratories argument: "[O]ne of
the happy incidents of the federal system is that a single courageous State may, if its citi-
zens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments with-
out risk to the rest of the country."44
In the 1990s, the state governments of Florida, Iowa, Vermont, and Wisconsin all
experimented with "time limits on the receipt of welfare." 45 Several states denied wel-
fare benefits to those who had additional children.46 If welfare policy had been made on-
ly in Washington, this would not have been possible.
This state policy diversity occurred at the same time that the federal government it-
self was contemplating, and eventually enacting, experiments with welfare reform via the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 that supple-
mented these state reforms. 4 7 This all transpired because "multiple lawmakers enable la-
boratories of experimentation."48 This cross-institutional policy heterogeneity is facili-
stronger central government in Canada than in the United States.").
43. See George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and
the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 331, 338 (1994) (describing subsidiarity as reflecting "[t]he notion that
action should be taken at the lowest level of government at which particular objectives can adequately be
achieved").
44. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
45. Nancy A. Wright, Welfare Reform Under the Personal Responsibility Act: Ending Welfare as We Know
It or Governmental Child Abuse?, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 357, 362 (1998) (citing Mark Greenberg, Ending
Welfare Law As We Know It: The New World Of Welfare Waivers, 4 CONSORTING 1, No. I (Nov. 1993); Jason
DeParle, In Welfare Debate, It's Not 'How?'But 'Why?', N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1994, at El).
46. Id. at 362-63 (citing DeParle, supra note 45, at Dl).
47. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2105, 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., & 8 U.S.C.);
see also Wright, supra note 45, at 358-62.
48. Erin O'Hara O'Connor & Larry E. Ribstein, Preemption and Choice-of-Law Coordination, 111 MICH.
L. REv. 647, 659 (2013) (citing New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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tated by jurisdictional competition for citizens and businesses. 49
The opportunity for policy innovation is made possible because multiple lawmak-
ers means more minds thinking about policy issues, but also because multiple lawmakers
are more difficult to monitor. The federal government has a more difficult time monitor-
ing multiple institutions as part of its decision whether to preempt state action. There is
so much more state and local law for the federal government to monitor.50 Interest
groups have a more difficult time monitoring multiple institutions as part of their efforts
to persuade governments to take or refrain from certain actions. 5 1 A powerful interest
group might be able to persuade one legislature to support their cause, but it will be diffi-
cult to persuade fifty other state legislatures to do precisely the same thing. In other
words, more institutions mean more agents to monitor, thereby increasing agency costs
substantially. 52
The flip side of the same policy innovation coin argument is that it causes repre-
sentational diversity. Citizens in different states want different policies, so permitting
there to be different states allows these states to accommodate preference heterogenei-
ty. 53 More different types of policies are important because it "allows for laws to be tai-
lored to different tastes, conditions, and preferences." 54
Another reason for federalism that implicates numerical federalism arguments is
that more institutions create more diversity of politics.55 Federalism "increases oppor-
tunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes"56 by increasing the number of
institutions where democratic processes transpire. Because there are fewer citizens sub-
ject to each government, "the creation of sub-governments reduces the monitoring prob-
lem" for citizens because there are not as "many citizens subject to [each] govern-
ment." 57 Each discrete group of citizens can more easily monitor their government and
ensure that their government represents their discrete preferences. 58
Again, though, the argument is that numbers beget diversity. If access to each gov-
ernment were identical, there would not be cheaper citizen monitoring even with more
government. For instance, even with criminal law set mostly by states and localities,59
more states with power over criminal justice might not produce different criminal justice
politics if there is a "systematic bias in the interest group environment across levels of
government"60 in favor of the political efforts of victims, or of prosecutors, and so on. It
49. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcoN. 416, 422 (1956).
50. Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73
CORNELL L. REv. 677, 709 (1988).
51. See O'Connor & Ribstein, supra note 48, at 660.
52. Seeidat661.
53. Steven G. Calabresi & Nicholas Terrell, The Number ofStates and the Economics ofAmerican Federal-
ism, 63 FLA. L. REv. 1, 34 (2011).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 34-35.
56. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
57. Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1591 (2010).
58. Id.
59. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward A Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
509, 529 (2004) ("American criminal law remains, by and large, state criminal law.").
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has to be different in what it takes to influence the South Carolina legislature than it is to
influence the Oklahoma legislature.
Another argument for federalism is that it can serve as "a check on abuses of gov-
ernment power."61 This implicates numerical arguments because the multiple institutions
empowered to act are not colluding but rather competing. Whether it is politics, policy,
or both, numbers make competition possible because numbers create different institu-
tions with different interests rather than the same institutions with the same interests.
Numbers facilitate diversity, and that diversity is what creates competition rather than
collusion. As Alexander Hamilton explained in The Federalist Papers, "[p]ower [is] al-
most always the rival of power" and if the "rights" of the people are invaded by one part
of the government then the people can make use of an "other" government "as the in-
strument of redress." 6 2 As James Madison put it, it is because federalism does not in-
volve a "single republic" or a "single government" and rather is a "compound republic"
that yields "distinct governments" or "different governments" that provides a protection
against usurpation of liberty.63
These are the commonly offered reasons for federalism, and there are also compet-
ing visions of how best to maximize these reasons for our goals of federalism. Gerken
highlights the "sovereignty" account of federalism, which imagines the federal govern-
ment and states "swim[ming] in their own lanes, carrying out their own programs within
their own independent spheres." 64 Sovereignty is the legal means that makes having a
greater number of institutions with power possible.65 It provides space for "policies sep-
arate and apart from the center." 66 Because state sovereignty creates a protected space
for state governments, state governments can enact a diversity of policies. 67
Gerken highlights the "servant" account that other scholars have argued produces
the public goods that are the reasons for federalism.68 This account focuses on "integra-
tion and interdependence."69 Known sometimes as "cooperative federalism"70 this ac-
count of federalism argues that the federal government and state governments are sepa-
rate, but separate and overlapping. Because state governments are the agents
implementing the wishes of the federal government principal, it is their status as a sepa-
rate agent that produces diversity of outcomes. 71
The result is more diversity than if everything was only controlled by Washington
because of agency slack. The agency slack makes it possible to have the diversity that
results from adaptation of policies "to local conditions,"72 greater "competition"73 be-
61. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
62. THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 151 (A.B.A. ed. 2001) (Alexander Hamilton).
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 295 (A.B.A. ed. 2001) (James Madison) (emphasis added).
64. Gerken, Foreword, supra note 5, at 34.
65. Id
66. Id. at 13.
67. See id. at 14.
68. Id. at 33.
69. Id. at 34.
70. For examples of this genre of scholarship, see, for example, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cooperative Fed-
eralism and Co-Optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative
Federalism, and the Enforcement ofthe Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1692 (2001).
71. See Gerken, Foreword, supra note 5, at 20-21.
72. See Weiser, supra note 70, at 1696.
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tween different policies, and more "experimentation with different approaches." 74 This is
numerical federalism: separateness multiplies the number of institutions and when added
to interaction that produces diversity of outcomes.
B. The Numerical Arguments for Dissenting by Deciding
Gerken's arguments for DBD also use this argumentative structure: more institu-
tions yield more different policies and politics. 75 Gerken's contribution, as she frames it,
is based on the notion that DBD is increasing the number of institutions with power by
varying the types of institutions that exercise power.76 She varies the types of institutions
with controlling power by varying who controls these institutions.77 This, in turn, creates
different types of institutions. 78
For example, at least as pertains to gay marriage, former San Francisco Mayor
Gavin Newsom had the "minority view"79 in California and the United States when he
ordered marriage licenses to be issued. It was the fact that the leader of San Francisco
had a "minority view" and had policy-making control in San Francisco that increased the
number of institutions with policy-making power.80 If it were only up to the State of Cal-
ifornia or the United States to issue marriage licenses there would be fewer institutions
with policy-making power.
But why do we care that minority views control institutions as well as majority
views? Because these institutions controlled by minority views produce a greater diversi-
ty of outputs than if the "majority view" controlled all institutions. 8 1 For instance,
Gerken justifies DBD because it produces a diversity of policy outputs.82 Newsom has a
different position on gay marriage than does the State of California or the United States,
and putting him in charge of San Francisco means that San Francisco produces a differ-
ent policy output - legalizing gay marriage - than if someone else controlled San
Francisco. 83 DBD would not produce a diversity of policy outputs if, even when con-
trolled by a minority view, the City of San Francisco for whatever reason had the same
policy on gay marriage as did California or the United States.
This diversity of policy outputs has downstream diversity consequences for Gerken
as well. Once other institutions see the policy enacted by the institution controlled by the
"minority view," these different policies provide "real-world example[s] of what their
principles would look like in practice,"84 and this gives society a better chance "to test its
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, supra note 6, at 1107-08.
76. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 7, at 1759-60.
77. See id. at 1763-64.
78. See id.
79. Id. at 1748.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 1747 ("The assumption underlying this conventional view of dissent is that dissent means
speaking truth to power, not with it. That is, we assume that dissenters will be in the minority on any deci-
sionmaking body.").
82. Id. at 1759-60.
83. See id at 1747-48.
84. Id. at 1754.
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views and positions."8 5 It is not just that Newsom creating gay marriage in San Francis-
co changes what happens in San Francisco, but it might be that New York enacted a gay
marriage law in 2011 86 because it observed the experience in San Francisco.
Again, this is because of the relationship between the number of institutions and
diversity of outputs. Newsom did something different than California did because there
is a separate policy-making institution he controls; New York did something different
because it is separate from California, from San Francisco, and from the United States,
and it was perhaps persuaded by what San Francisco did.
To be clear, Gerken need not believe that federalism creates "experimentation" in
the way that Justice Brandeis imagined. There might be two traditional, obvious, and
well-tested ways of resolving a policy issue. DBD could produce a diversity of outputs
even when these outputs are familiar. Perhaps Newsom faced a familiar set of policy
choices, and he just picked one of them.
The diversity of outputs is also observable in terms of the diversity of political
outputs. 87 DBD "has a direct political consequence" of making the minority view "visi-
ble"88 by giving it "binding legal effect" 89 and thereby permitting political minorities to
engage "in the type of agenda setting that is otherwise difficult for those outside the po-
litical mainstream."90 Because Newsom controls San Francisco and enacts different pol-
icies, it might be that Mississippi starts talking more about gay marriage.
DBD changes politics by changing the topic of conversations. And DBD changes
the topic of conversation because with more institutions there will be more of a variety of
conversations. Gerken highlights state laws that expressed displeasure with the federal
Patriot Act and how this changed the state and national conversation about national secu-
rity law.91 Because some states were enacting laws repudiating the Patriot Act, it created
a conversation in those states and then in other states about how to protect national secu-
rity without a Patriot Act. If all fifty states said the same thing about the Patriot Act, then
the conversation about the Patriot Act would not have been diversified either. DBD relies
on the notion that Newsom's decision to issue gay marriage licenses will change the po-
litical conversation in many of the institutions of government in the American federal
system.
THE RELATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF FEDERALISM AND DISSENTING BY DECIDING
A greater number of institutions begetting a greater diversity of outputs - either
policy or political outputs - is a contingent empirical phenomenon. It could be that cre-
85. Id. at 1759. See id. at 1766 ("Dissenting by deciding offers a real-life instantiation of an idea. It thus
allows electoral minorities to remap the politics of the possible. When dissent takes the form of decision, elec-
toral minorities have a chance to put their ideas into practice, to move from abstract principles to actual poli-
cy.").
86. See Thomas Kaplan, After Long Wait, Gay Couples Marry in New York, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2011, at
A4.
87. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 7, at 1762.
88. Id. at 1762, 1760.
89. Id. at 1762.
90. Id (citation omitted).
91. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, Uncooperative, supra note 18, at 1278-81.
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ating more institutions never matters, as William Riker famously wrote. 92
A more plausible and empirically supported hypothesis is that whether and when
the number of institutions produces more diversity of outputs depends on a number of
variables. One reason for lesser or no diversity given greater numbers of institutions
might be who exactly controls these different institutions of policy-making power in a
federal system. These are atomized reasons to doubt the empirical hypothesis, which I
mentioned earlier - reasons having to do with the particular people or forces controlling
power at the state level.
For instance, as David Schleicher points out in his contribution to this symposium,
voters tend to view all politics through a national lens.93 Therefore, increasing the num-
ber of institutions might not increase the diversity of outputs because it does not increase
the diversity of inputs. 94 If the Democratic Party of New York features the same types of
figures supported by the same types of coalitions as the Democratic Party of Mississippi,
then Democratic governors of New York and Democratic governors of Mississippi might
produce the same outputs.
It could be that not only are all politics the same, but actually sub-national politics
are inferior to the point of not producing anything different in terms of politics or policy.
As Ernest Young has written, state governors in the United States often become Presi-
dent. 95 In other federal systems, particularly where there is an opposition party empow-
ered at the national level, presidents and prime ministers tend to make their name as fed-
eral ministers rather than state governors. 96 Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany,
spent almost her entire career before becoming Chancellor as an elected member, minis-
ter, and then opposition leader in the national German Bundestag. 9 7 If the political tradi-
tion of a state, or of all states, were like the German version, then inferior political fig-
ures would be in control at the state level. Inferior political figures might be more
inclined to copy and repeat rather than diversify and innovate.
This is related to the point that the diversity of outputs depends on the pre-existing
capacities of particular state governments. The sociologist Michael Mann calls this "in-
frastructural capacity,"98 meaning that some sub-national institutions have sticky tradi-
tions of leaders who are more "deeply embedded in their societies." 99 In the United
States, more numbers of institutions might produce more diversity depending on how
many states have rules encouraging and traditions recognizing strong state governors and
92. See William H. Riker, Six Books in Search of a Subject or Does Federalism Exist and Does It Matter?,
2 COMP. POL. 135, 145 (1969) ("Do[ more institutions] make any difference in the way people are governed?
[T]he answer appears to be ... [h]ardly at all.").
93. David Schleicher, From Here All-The-Way-Down, or How to Write a Festschrift Piece, 48 TULSA L.
REv. 401, 416-17 (2013).
94. See id
95. Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the War
on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1286 (2004).
96. See David Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L.J. 548, 553 (2009).
97. See Angela Merkel, WALL ST. J., http://topics.wsj.com/person/M/angela-merkel/5351 (last visited Apr.
24, 2013).
98. See I MICHAEL MANN, THE SOURCES OF SOCIAL POWER: A HISTORY OF POWER FROM THE BEGINNING
TO A.D. 1760, at 59-61, 170 (1986).
99. Daniel Ziblatt, Rethinking the Origins of Federalism: Puzzle, Theory, and Evidence from Nineteenth-
Century Europe, 57 WORLD POL. 70, 71 (2004).
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governments. If there were more powerful executives like the Governor of New York,
that would be different than if there were more weak executives like the Governor of
Texas.100
These are reasons for questioning numerical accounts for federalism based on who
is likely to hold power, and they cast doubt on the empirical hypothesis that I argued is at
the core of standard DBD accounts for federalism. But there are other reasons to doubt
numerical accounts for federalism based not on who is in power in the federal system,
but on how those in a federal system interact with one another. These interactions and
how they affect what federalism produces are called relational accounts of federalism.
Federalism is about interactions between institutions, or relationships, as much as it is
about the number of institutions.
While accounts of federalism that focus on the discrete and atomized actors of fed-
eralism matter, I will focus more on the relationships between the actors of federalism.
These relationships matter because in a federal system "the choices of constitutional ac-
tors are strategically interdependent." 10 ' Gerken's account of federalism innovates when
it comes to identifying possible changes to the relationships of federalism.102 I will focus
on how federalism is relational in general, how Gerken's theory is relational, and how
her relational theory of federalism could produce the kind of diversity of outputs that
numerical accounts of federalism require.
A. How Federalism is Relational and the Diversity ofRelational Federalism
Federalism is relational along many dimensions, and how it is relational varies
along the dimensions of both how often and how close or collegial relationships in a fed-
eral system are. At the vertical level, in the United States, the federal government will
often bargain with state governments to enforce federal laws and is therefore "prepared
to make concessions to [its] state counterparts." 03 Anti-commandeering rules require
that the federal government must negotiate this compliance by state governments rather
than assume it or coerce it.104 States agreeing to work with the federal government have
"discretion in choosing how to accomplish ... tasks and which tasks to prioritize."lo5
The close relationship between local and national political parties creates networks of
federal and state officials that might increase cooperation and closeness - what Larry
Kramer called the "political safeguards of federalism."l 0 6 On the other hand, the federal
government can always preempt state governments, largely without cause, without warn-
ing, and without negotiation, 107 and that minimizes the amount of interaction and the
100. See Patrick Wohlfarth, Gubernatorial Power: The Institutional Power Ratings for the 50 Governors of
the United States, available at http://www.unc.edu/-beyle/gubnewpwr.html (last updated July 2008).
101. Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARv. L. REv. 4, 7 (2009).
102. See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, Uncooperative, supra note 18.
103. DANIEL J. ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: A VIEW FROM THE STATES 182 (3d ed. 1984).
104. See Neil S. Siegel, Commandeering and Its Alternatives: A Federalism Perspective, 59 VAND. L. REV.
1629, 1634-35 (2006).
105. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, Uncooperative, supra note 18, at 1266.
106. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000).
107. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[T]he [1]aws of the United States which shall be made in [p]ursuance"
of the Constitution are "the supreme [ljaw of the [1]and . . . .").
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collegial nature of those interactions.
The relationships at the vertical level differ in other systems, in particular by fea-
turing more frequent and more collegial relationships. In the German system, the Land,
or states, "send[] members of [their] cabinet to represent . . . interests in" one house of
the federal legislature.108 This means that representatives of sub-national actors interact
more frequently with national actors because the votes of sub-national actors sitting in
the federal legislature are necessary to enact many pieces of legislation.109 Interaction is
more frequent as well because the German Basic Law requires sharing of certain reve-
nues between the central and the state governments.1 10
Not just is interaction more frequent, but also in many federal systems interaction
is more intimate than in the American system. In the German system, there is a constitu-
tional obligation that federal actors consult sub-national actors and play nice with
them. In the German system, there is a duty of comity requiring federal and state go v-
ernments to negotiate in good faith before acting to ensure that the interests of all institu-
tions are considered.112 In other systems there are also concurrent federal and state pow-
ers, essentially requiring that federal and state governments work together to agree on
how to regulate and how to distribute regulatory authority. 113
Federalism also features horizontal relationships. American states interact differ-
ently depending on whether they agree to a formal arrangement under the Compact
Clause of the Constitution. 114 States interact differently if they are geographically closer
or politically closer.115 Just as relationships between federal and state are not fixed, so
too the relationships between state and state are not fixed. The relational dimensions of
federalism can vary substantially in both a vertical and horizontal way.
B. How Relational Federalism Might Matter
The heterogeneity of these relationships is centrally relevant in assessing whether
more institutions produce more diversity of outputs. Relational versions of federalism
have only been discussed in the context of causing some scholars to doubt whether these
relationships create incentives for diversification. 116 Scholars have argued that the par-
ticular nature of relationships in federalism can create federalism free riding.
108. See Daniel Halberstam & Roderick M. Hills, Jr., State Autonomy in Germany and the United States,
574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 173, 175 (2001).
109. GRUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [Basic Law], May 23,
1949, BGBI. I at art. 50 (Ger.) ("The Lander shall participate through the Bundesrat in the legislation and ad-
ministration of the Federation and in matters concerning the European Union.").
110. See id at art. 106(3) (Ger.).
111. DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY 69 (2d ed. 1997).
112. See id. (identifying a constitutional "principle of federal comity ... which obligates federal and state
governments to consider each other's interests in exercising their authority"). See also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 77-80 (1994) (noting a "constitutional analog of the
general civil-law duty . . . to act in good faith").
113. See, e.g., INDIA CONST. art. 246 (listing "concurrent" powers).
114. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3.
115. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy?: Policy Innovation in Decentralized
Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1351-52 (2009).
116. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980).
2013 515
13
Fontana: Relational Federalism: An Essay in Honor of Heather Gerken
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2012
TULSA LAW REVIEW
Most notably, Susan Rose-Ackerman has argued that relational federalism is im-
portant because it can undermine the output diversity that federalism aspires to
achieve." 7 She argued that no government receives the full benefit of diversifying be-
cause there are no property rights in governmental diversity, and therefore there is no in-
stitution that has a strong incentive to innovate.118 Moreover, an incumbent political fig-
ure with a strong chance of reelection faces little incentive to innovate. 119
Subsequent research has demonstrated that more numbers can still incentivize
more diversity, but this depends on the relationships between these numbers.120 If states
are located more closely to one another, they tend to interact more often, which tends to
produce more similar outputs.121 In that situation, it would not matter if there were ten
different states right next to each other - greater numbers would still not produce more
diversity of outputs.122 Similarly, states that tend to view one another as ideologically
similar produce similar outputs.123 If New York were bordered by Mississippi it would
produce more diversity of outputs when they interact than the diversity of outputs created
by Connecticut bordering New York.
This is an important insight about how the relational dimensions of federalism can
problematize the numbers begetting diversity assumption. It is also true that relationships
between institutions create not just incentives to produce output diversity, but capacities
to produce output diversity. In other words, even with greater numbers, greater diversity
is likely to result only depending on whether the nature of the relationships creates the
capacity to produce a diversity of outputs.
We have substantial empirical support for the proposition that relationships pro-
duce a diversity of output when these relationships are close enough to be relevant and
conducted with more social distance between the parties to the relationship.124 This
means that there is interaction, but that the interaction transpires in a way that creates and
potentially even reinforces the distance between the interacting parties. 125 In the psycho-
logical literature, the research suggesting that diversity of outputs results from interaction
with social distance is known as "construal-level theory" ("CLT").126 CLT has demon-
strated that "people construct different mental representations of the same information
depending on whether that information" is socially distant or socially close.127 The CLT
literature tends to "operationalize[] [social distance] as interpersonal similarity."' 28 if
117. See generally id.
118. See generally id.
119. Id. at 594.
120. See Frances Stokes Berry & William D. Berry, State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event
History Analysis, 84 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 395 (1990).
121. See id at 399-400; Frederick J. Boehmke & Richard Witmer, Disentangling Diffusion: The Effects of
Social Learning and Economic Competition on State Policy Innovation and Expansion, 57 POL. RES. Q. 39, 40
(2004).
122. See Boehmke & Witmer, supra note 121, at 40.
123. See Ken Kollman et al., Decentralization and the Search for Policy Solutions, 16 J.L. EcON. & ORG.
102, 109, 122 (2000).
124. See, e.g., Xiaoli Nan, Social Distance, Framing, and Judgment: A Construal Level Perspective, 33
HUM. COMM. RES. 489 (2007).
125. Id. at 490.
126. See id.
127. Id. at 489.
128. Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Construal-Level Theory of Psychological Distance, 117 PSYCHOL.
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information is received from someone with "greater [levels of] similarity"1 29 then that
leads that information to be construed at a lower-level, and thus to be construed more in
terms of its "superordinate [and primary] features."1 3 0 If the information is received
from someone with lower levels of similarity, then that leads the information to be con-
strued more according to its secondary features. 13 1
People do not know how they "will spend the day [ten] years from now"1 32 but
they can describe that tomorrow (a psychologically closer item) they will have "a break-
fast of oatmeal [and] a 10 a.m. meeting with a research collaborator."l33 This makes in-
tuitive sense: when things are closer, we know them better, and can fill in the many de-
tails to make these things closer. When they are farther away, we know less about them,
and must construct more abstract pictures of them.
Socially distant interactions are more likely to produce innovative results because
"creativity [is] related to high-level construal." 134 This is because "proximity reduces
consideration of alternatives."l35 Considering alternatives then disrupts the normal cog-
nitive inertia that leads one to focus on familiar options.136 This is also because gains
increase in salience relative to losses when the person seems farther away. 137 Social dis-
tance makes it easier to innovate because the benefits become more significant relative to
the costs. If you seem very different than I do, and I interact with you, our interactions
are more likely to generate diversity of outputs. If you seem very similar to me, and I in-
teract with you, our interactions are more likely to generate identical outputs. Talking to
the same person every day is not generative in the same way that talking to a new person
is.
A version of CLT has been tested in the policy diffusion literature, which examines
when one jurisdiction "introduce[s] a change in their laws that . . . . [is] later emu-
late[d]."138 This literature, particularly in the federalism context, supports the CLT find-
ing that less social distance reduces diversity of outputs. Policies are more likely to be
copied from one state to another state if those states are more similar to one another. 139
REv. 440, 451 (2010) (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 456.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 457.
132. Kentaro Fujita & Jessica J. Carnevale, Transcending Temptation Through Abstraction: The Role of
Construal Level in SelfControl, 21 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SC. 248, 249 (2012).
133. Id.
134. Trope & Liberman, supra note 128, at 458. For studies demonstrating this, see Ronald A. Finke, Crea-
tive Insight and Preinventive Forms, in THE NATURE OF INSIGHT 255 (Robert J. Sternberg & Janet E. Davidson
eds., 1995); THOMAS B. WARD, RONALD A. FINKE & STEVEN M. SMITH, CREATIVITY AND THE MIND:
DISCOVERING THE GENIUS WITHIN (1995); Jens Fdrster, Ronald S. Friedman & Nira Liberman, Temporal
Construal Effects on Abstract and Concrete Thinking: Consequences for Insight and Creative Cognition, 87 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 177 (2004).
135. Nira Liberman, Yaacov Trope & Cherly Wakslak, Construal Level Theory and Consumer Behavior, 17
J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 113, 116 (2007). For a study on precisely this point, see John G. Lynch, Jr. & Gal
Zauberman, Construing Consumer Decision Making, 17 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 107 (2007).
136. See Derek J. Koehler, Explanation, Imagination, and Confidence in Judgment, 110 PSYCHOL. BULL.
499, 499 (1991).
137. See Stefan M. Herzog, Jochim Hansen & Michaela Wtnke, Temporal Distance and Ease of Retrieval,
43 J. EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 483, 483 (2007).
138. Stavros Gadinis, From Independence to Politics in Financial Regulation, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 327, 357
n.147 (2013).
139. See Lawrence J. Grossback, Sean Nicholson-Crotty & David A.M. Peterson, Ideology and Learning in
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The similarity that mitigates the relationship between the number of states and di-
versity of outputs can be defined many ways. In vertical federal relationships - the rela-
tionships between the federal government and states - the research suggests that the
more demographic, ideological and other similarities there are between who is in power
in the federal government and who is in power in state governments, the less diversity of
outputs there is.140 On the horizontal level, states are more likely to copy policies from
states that seem similar in terms of the political ideology of the exporting state.14 1 States
are more likely to copy policies from states that are geographically proximate. 142 States
are more likely to copy policies from other states that are socially similar in other ways
as well, including demographically. 143
In other words, the relationship between the number of institutions and the diversi-
ty of outputs is contingent rather than inevitable. More institutions might be necessary
for diversity, but more institutions are not sufficient. These institutions must interact in a
way that produces diversity of outputs. Federal systems, then, might generate more di-
versity depending on whether there is sufficient interaction and also sufficient social dis-
tance between participants in the federal system.
C. The Relational Innovation ofDissenting by Deciding and Why it Matters
Given that relationships affect whether the number of institutions produces diversi-
ty of outputs, it is helpful to examine how DBD affects relationships between institutions
in a federal system. DBD theorizes a new relationship between institutions in a federal
system. 144 It is not framed this way, but the relational innovation of DBD is perhaps its
most important contribution. It fills in one of the holes of federalism theory. It plugs in
this hole by creating relationships that other literature suggests bridge the gap between
the means federalism scholarship uses and the goals federalism scholarship desires. DBD
is the goldilocks of federalism theory. It features the interaction lacking in some accounts
along with the social distance missing in other accounts.
DBD is a relational innovation in two ways. First, DBD increases the frequency of
interactions in the American federal system. 145 It creates tighter relationships. For rela-
tionships to promote or minimize diversity of outputs, there must of course first be mean-
ingful interaction.146
Policy Difusion, 32 AM. POL. REs. 521 (2004).
140. See George A. Krause & Ann O'M. Bowman, Adverse Selection, Political Parties, and Policy Delega-
tion in the American Federal System, 21 J.L. ECON & ORG. 359 (2005).
141. See Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty & Peterson, supra note 139, at 526 ("The effect of a government
adopting the policy will be greatest on states that are the most ideologically similar to the adopting government.
Similarly, information from an ideologically dissimilar state will reduce the likelihood of adoption.").
142. See Julianna Pacheco, The Social Contagion Model: Exploring the Role of Public Opinion on the Diffu-
sion ofAnti-smoking Legislation across the American States, 74 J. POL. 187, 187 (2012).
143. See Craig Volden, States as Policy Laboratories: Emulating Success in the Children's Health Insurance
Program, 50 AM. J. POL. Sc. 294 (2006).
144. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 7.
145. See id. at 1759-62.
146. See generally Barbara Wejnert, Integrating Models of Diffision of Innovations: A Conceptual Frame-
work, 28 ANN. REv. Soc. 297 (2002).
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By providing political minorities with decisional authority, DBD incentivizes more
interactions between institutions. 14 7 This is one of the primary goals of DBD according
to Gerken - to be relevant, "dissent must be visible." 14 8 As Gerken argues, under DBD
the "federal government will be pressured to engage the state's position."l49 Now more
people in the State of California or the United States of America know that the City of
San Francisco can issue marriage licenses because a political minority, Gavin Newsom,
ordered the City to issue those licenses. 15 0
By contrast, in federalism "of the servant," 15 1 otherwise known as "cooperative
federalism,"l52 the interaction between the federal government and state governments is
less common. This is because the federal government or other parts of state government
need not overrule a binding, final decision by an empowered official. American preemp-
tion is relatively easy for the federal government, and so relatively less interaction is re-
quired between the federal government and state governments. As compared to DBD,
interaction is less frequent in cooperative federalism because political minorities can do
less to attract the attention of political majorities.
In federalism "of the sovereign,"1 53 neither the federal government nor state gov-
ernments need engage deeply with one another. This is because "dual federalism" en-
sures that each sovereign political institution has a separate sphere to govern. 154 Let's
say, for instance, that California has broad jurisdiction over criminal law, and the federal
government does not. California need not interact with the federal government in formu-
lating California criminal law because the federal government can do very little to over-
rule California criminal law. The federal government need not interact with California
because there is very little that the federal government can do in the criminal law area.
In addition to increasing the frequency of interactions, in DBD interaction changes
from collegial to combative. As Gerken describes DBD, interaction would include dis-
cussions that range "from restrained disagreement to fighting words." 1 55 Gerken states
that"[i]f you think that our political system already has a sufficient amount of delibera-
tive froth, there is little point in giving dissenters the power to set the agenda."' 5 6
In other words, DBD increases the social distance featured in relationships.157 So-
cial distance is created in part by the absence of "similarity" between interacting par-
ties. 158 DBD creates and reinforces this dissimilarity because it only empowers those
147. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 7, at 1749.
148. Id.
149. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, Uncooperative, supra note 18, at 1287.
150. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 7, at 1754.
151. See Gerken, OfSovereigns and Servants, supra note 7.
152. See sources cited supra note 18.
153. See Gerken, Of Sovereigns and Servants, supra note 7.
154. See Gerken, Foreword, supra note 5, at 9.
155. Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, Uncooperative, supra note 18, at 1271.
156. See Gerken, Foreword, supra note 5, at 68.
157. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 7, at 1748-49.
158. See Elena Stephan, Nira Liberman & Yaacov Trope, The Effects of Time Perspective and Level of Con-
strual on Social Distance, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSCYHOL. 397 (2011). For articles making the same point
about how social distance can be created by disagreement, see Bernadette Park & Charles M. Judd, Measures
and Models of Perceived Group Variability, 59 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 173 (1990).
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with a "minority view.",159 DBD is dissenting by deciding, meaning that only those who
disagree are empowered.160 Disagreement is hardwired into the system, and this disa-
greement creates distance.
If states were interacting with little social distance, then they would produce the
same outputs. If all mayors were like Gavin Newsom, even if all mayors talked more,
there would be more jurisdictions with San Francisco-style gay marriage. It is because
Gavin Newsom's gay marriage decision caused him to interact with a moderate Republi-
can Governor and a conservative Republican President that a range of approaches to gay
marriage was produced.
As with its encouragement of more interactions, its encouragement of interactions
premised on disagreement and distance is part of what leads DBD to create a better rela-
tional account of federalism. Cooperative federalism might feature more frequent inter-
actions. But the frequent interactions of cooperative federalism do not feature as much
social distance between interacting parties because everyone "depend[s] on one another
to get anything done."1 6 1 The federal government is the principal, and given this "inter-
dependence" 1 62 there are incentives to create the most similar agent to the federal gov-
ernment's principal. 163
For dual federalism, with the power of the sovereign, the federal government and
state governments disagree. But the federal government and state governments do not
interact as much as with DBD because each level of government has its own "separate"
regulatory spaces.164 If California disagrees with the policies of the federal government,
it will be able to express this disagreement by exercising its own separate, sovereign
powers. California can act more in its own, and more without fear of any federal preemp-
tion, though, so there is less interaction than with DBD.
There are contexts in which scholars have noted the poisonous effects of greater
group interaction premised on disagreement. In some situations, these interactions can
polarize, creating what one scholar has called the "law of group polarization."165 When
faced with opposing information, members of one group might "move toward a more ex-
treme position."l66 When Republicans listen to what Democrats have to say, after they
finish listening they become more conservative rather than less conservative. 167
Because of the relational innovation of DBD, DBD is more immune from these
laws of group polarization. Group polarization does not result when deliberating groups
receive "sustained exposure to competing views." 168 Real dialogue - even if conten-
tious dialogue - does not polarize. DBD creates a sustained exposure to the "minority
159. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 7, at 1748.
160. Id. at 1759-60.
161. Gerken, Foreword, supra note 5, at 34.
162. Id.
163. See Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics, in CHICAGO LECTUREs IN LAW AND
ECONOMICs 225, 230 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000) (highlighting ways to minimize agency slack).
164. See Gerken, Foreword, supra note 5, at 9.
165. Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 175 (2002).
166. Id. at 74.
167. See Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What To Think by Knowing Who You Are: Self-Categorization
and the Nature of Norm Formation, Conformity and Group Polarization, 29 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 97, 112-
13 (1990).
168. Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 75 (2000).
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view" on an issue because the minority view has decisional power.169 Overturning
Mayor Newsom's decision to issue same-sex marriage licenses took an elaborate back-
and-forth with the State of California and the United States.1 70
Higher levels of government had their agenda set by Newsom's decision, and if
they disliked it they had to go through the formal process of overruling it. It might be
that otherwise the State of California or the President of the United States would have
ignored Newsom, and thus the "law of group polarization" would have applied.171 But
the decisional power that DBD gives minorities ensures the "sustained exposure to com-
peting views"' 72 that can overcome further polarization.
CONCLUSION
Gerken's primary focus in her writings on DBD has been federalism, and therefore
that has been the primary focus of my contribution to this Symposium. But the innova-
tion of DBD is a larger one, not confined to federalism or necessarily even to public law.
The innovation of DBD is in realizing that relationships matter, and we must configure
relationships in a certain way to produce certain outputs. This is an insight that scholars
beyond just constitutional law should take note of and use to reconfigure their fields as
well. Relationships matter in all areas of life, and so they matter in all areas of public law
as well.
169. See Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, supra note 7, at 1748.
170. See id.
171. See Sunstein, supra note 165.
172. Sunstein, supra note 168, at 75.
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